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We examine how collateral affects the cost of debt capital. Theories based on borrower moral hazard
and limited pledgeable income predict that collateral increases the availability of credit and reduces
its price. Testing these theories is complicated by the very selection problem which they imply: creditors
will demand collateral precisely from those borrowers who are riskier. This selection problem leads
to a positive relation in the data between the presence of collateral and the loan yield. Analyzing the
extensive margin of collateral use, therefore, masks the hypothesized negative impact that collateral
exhibits on debt yields. In this paper, we alleviate this problem by focusing on a particular industry
and examining its intensive, rather than extensive, margin of collateral use. Using a novel data set
of secured debt issued by U.S. airlines, we construct industry-specific measures of collateral redeployability.
We show that debt tranches that are secured by more redeployable collateral exhibit lower credit spreads,
higher credit ratings, and higher loan-to-value ratios -- an effect which our estimates show to be economically
sizeable. Our results suggest that the ability to pledge collateral, and in particular redeployable collateral,















Collateral is of central importance in the theory and practice of corporate ﬁnance. In particular,
collateral allows the creditor to recover, at least partially, a loan made to a debtor. The ability
to seize and sell collateral when a debtor fails to make a promised payment reduces the creditor’s
expected losses upon default. All else equal, therefore, if a ﬁrm pledges collateral when issuing
bonds or taking a loan, the price at which it obtains credit should be lower.
There is an extensive theoretical literature showing that collateral can be used to alleviate
ﬁnancial frictions stemming from moral hazard and adverse selection eﬀects (Aghion and Bolton,
1992; Johnson and Stulz, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1994 and 1998; Hart, 1995). The presence of
collateral in a loan, therefore, may be correlated with unobserved ﬁrm characteristics which have
a ﬁrst order impact on loan rates. For example, previous theories focusing on moral hazard argue
that ﬁrms with greater default risk pledge collateral as a mechanism to increase pledgeable income
(see, e.g., ; Berger and Udell, 1990, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2008;
Tirole, 2005). Consistent with these theories, empirical evidence shows that creditors require ﬁrms
with poor repayment histories or ﬁrms with greater default risk to secure their loans with collateral
(see, e.g., Hester, 1979; Berger and Udell, 1995; and Jimenez et al., 2006).
The selection eﬀect, in which riskier ﬁrms are more likely to be required to pledge collateral,
makes it diﬃcult to analyze the impact of collateralon loan rates by examining the extensive margin
of collateral use – i.e., whether a loan has collateral or not. Indeed, a number of past studies have
found a positive relation between loan rates and the existence of collateral, consistent with a moral
hazard induced selection eﬀect in which collateral is required of high default-risk ﬁrms (see, e.g.,
Berger and Udell, 1990; John et al., 2003; Knox, 2005). Testing the eﬀect of collateral on loan rates
by analyzing its extensive margin suﬀers, therefore, from endogeneity and selection bias.
In this paper, we study collateral pricing by examining the intensive margin of collateral use –
i.e., variation in the value of collateral to lenders. Using a novel dataset of secured debt tranches
issued by U.S. airlines, we construct measures of collateral redeployability as a proxy for creditors’
expected value of collateral upon default. We show that asset redeployability is negatively related
to credit spreads, and positively related to credit ratings and loan-to-value ratios in an economically
signiﬁcant manner. Thus, focusing on a particular industry and examining the intensive, rather
than the extensive, margin of collateral values reveals a negative impact of collateral on the price
1and amount of debt, and enables us to estimate the magnitude of this eﬀect.
Airlines in the U.S. issue tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which take a variety
of formats known as Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates (ETCs), Enhanced Equipment Trust Securities
(EETCs), and Pass Through Certiﬁcates (PTCs). Pledging aircraft from an airline’s ﬂeet as collat-
eral, these debt instruments served as the main source of external ﬁnancing for U.S. airlines during
the 1994-2005period. We construct a sample of aircraft tranche issues from SDC platinum and then
use ﬁling prospectuses to obtain the serial number of all aircraft that were pledged as collateral.
Matching aircraft serial numbers to the Ascend CASE airline database – a database containing
information on all commercial aircraft worldwide – we obtain detailed information about aircraft
characteristics such as aircraft type, engines, noise level, and age. As a result, for each of the debt
tranches in our sample we can identify precisely its underlying collateral.
Using the Ascend Case database, we also construct measures of aircraft redeployability to proxy
for the expected value of collateralto creditors upon default. Our proxies for aircraft redeployability
are motivated by Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) industry equilibrium model. We use three measures
of aircraft redeployability: 1) the number of aircraft per type; 2) the number of operators per
type; and 3) the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Our measures of
aircraft redeployability are proxies for the ease at which creditors will be able to liquidate their
positions, and hence capture the value to creditors of the collateral backing each secured tranche.
We then examine the relation between our measures of collateral redeployability and credit spreads
controlling for airline and tranche characteristics.
One concern about the eﬀect of collateral values on credit spreads is a selection eﬀect along the
intensive margin similar in spirit to that documented in previous literature. If higher default-risk
ﬁrms are required not only to pledge collateral, but also to pledge collateral of greater redeploya-
bility, increases in our redeployability measures would, in part, proxy for increases in airline default
risk. We test for selection in collateral quality by regressing our redeployability measures on proxies
for airline risk, and ﬁnd that they are not correlated with aircraft redeployability. Thus, a selection
bias in which higher default-risk ﬁrms are required to pledge collateral of greater redeployability is
not supported by the data.
Using our proxies for aircraft redeployability, we ﬁnd that more redeployable collateral is asso-
ciated with lower credit spreads. After controlling for tranche and airline characteristics and both
year and airline ﬁxed eﬀects, an increase from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in our
2redeployability measures is associated with a decrease in the spread that is between 58.0 and 64.2
basis points, representing a decrease of between 29.2 and 32.3 percentage points relative to the
mean spread. In interpreting the magnitude of our results, it is important to note that we are esti-
mating the eﬀect of collateral redeployability on spreads at the time of the credit issue. The value
of collateral is, therefore, priced based on the expected probability of liquidation value calculated as
of the issue date. Hence, to the extent that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position deteriorates and liquidation
probabilities increase post issue – a description accurate for many of the airlines in our sample –
we are underestimating the average life-time impact of collateral on credit spreads. Moreover, we
show that the ability to pledge redeployable collateral is more valuable during industry downturns;
that is redeployability is more important when the overall state of the industry is worse.
Next, we analyze the relation between the redeployability of collateral and credit ratings, loan-
to-value ratios and tranche maturity. We ﬁnd that more redeployable collateral is associated with
better credit ratings and higher loan-to-value ratios. We do not ﬁnd a statistical signiﬁcant relation
between collateral redeployability and tranche maturity. Our results provide insight into the role
that asset redeployability plays in the determination of credit spreads, credit ratings, and debt
capacity of secured debt and in particular of collateralized debt obligations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the theoretical framework
for the analysis. Section II provides the institutional details on the market for Equipment Trust
Certiﬁcates and Enhanced Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates. Section III describes our data and the
aircraft redeployability measures. Section IV presents the empirical analysis of the relation between
collateral redeployabilityand diﬀerent facets of collateralized debt obligations. Section V concludes.
I. Collateral and Debt Financing - Implications for the Airline
Industry
Most of the theory on the role of collateral in secured lending has focused either on situations
where borrowers exhibit moral hazard or on situations of adverse selection, with borrowers enjoying
private information about project quality. The nature of the ﬁnancial friction in these models
yields diﬀerential theoretical predictions. When the ﬁnancial friction is one of adverse selection
and asymmetric information, high quality ﬁrms are predicted to employ collateral when borrowing,
while ﬁrms of low quality are predicted to borrow using unsecured debt. For example, in Bester
(1985), lenders oﬀer diﬀerent loan contracts with variable collateral requirements where the interest
3rate is decreasing in the value of the collateral. The optimal contract in Bester (1985) is such that
risky borrowers pay a high interest rate but are not required to put down any collateral, while
safer borrowers put down some collateral and pay a lower interest rate. Collateral is thus used as a
signaling device by high quality borrowers to diﬀerentiate themselves from low quality ones. Such
signaling is made possible because higher quality ﬁrms ﬁnd it less costly to pledge collateral, since
the probability of them defaulting and losing their collateral is smaller. Similarly, Besanko and
Thakor (1987a), Besanko and Thakor (1987b), Chan and Kanatas (1985), and Chan and Thakor
(1987) all analyze the role of collateral in the presence of information asymmetry and deliver similar
predictions to those in Bester (1985) that lower-risk borrowers pledge more collateral.
In contrast to the predictions relying on adverse selection and hidden information, models that
are based on moral hazard predict that lower quality ﬁrms are required to use collateral when
raising capital, while higher quality ﬁrms are able to borrow without it (see, e.g., Berger and
Udell, 1990; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). In essence, collateral is used to increase borrowers’
pledgeable income and hence helps in obtaining external ﬁnance and reducing its price (see e.g.
Tirole, 2005; Qian and Strahan, 2007).
According to John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) and Tirole (2005) the empirical evidence suggests
that, consistent with the moral hazard models, low quality borrowers are those more likely to post
collateral (see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 1990; Booth 1992). For example, Hester (1979) ﬁnds that
bank analysts classiﬁed loans with collateral to be riskier, while Jimenez et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
creditors often require ﬁrms with poor repayment histories or ﬁrms which, ex-post, were more
likely to default, to pledge collateral. Furthermore, Harhoﬀ and Koring (1998) ﬁnd that the use of
collateral is more likely among ﬁrms which are in ﬁnancial distress at the time of the loan issue.
These results explain the empirical ﬁnding of a positive relation between the use of collateral and
debt yields (Berger and Udell, 1990 and 1995). The selection eﬀect, whereby low quality ﬁrms are
required to post collateral, leads to a positive bias in estimates of the eﬀect of collateral on the price
of loans. John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) ﬁnd also that the yield on collateralized debt is higher than
on unsecured debt after controlling for credit rating.1 Their results are interesting given that they
control for the borrower risk in their regressions. To explain these results John, Lynch, and Puri
(2003) develop a model that shows that agency problems aﬀect the value of collateralized assets,
1Likewise, Knox, (2005) ﬁnd that the eﬀects of collateral on a ﬁrm’s cost of capital is positive, after controlling
for borrower characteristics.
4so that if credit ratings fail to fully reﬂect the impact of agency problems on credit quality, then
secured debt will have higher yields than unsecured debt controlling for credit rating.
Collateral redeployability plays an important role in alleviating moral hazard problems and
increasing pledgeable income. In particular, more redeployable collateral - i.e. comprising of assets
that have better alternative uses - helps in reducing the costs of external ﬁnance because assets
can be sold for a higher price in the event of default (Tirole, 2005). However, since an increase in
the liquidation value of an asset may also raise the optimal debt level, the net eﬀect of liquidation
value on promised debt yields is analytically ambiguous. Harris and Raviv (1990) show in numeric
results that, controlling for the debt level of the ﬁrm, higher liquidation values are associated with
lower promised yields, since creditors can expect a higher payment in the case of default.
The airline industry is a natural candidate for analyzing the relation between collateral and
debt ﬁnancing. During the period 1990-2005, secured debt became the primary source for external
ﬁnance of aircraft by airlines in the U.S.2 Since secured debt is used by virtually all airlines in the
U.S., risk-based selection is less likely to explain collateral use in the airline industry. Moreover, our
sample represents secured debt issues by large publicly traded airlines that include the 10 largest
scheduled passengers in the U.S (out of which 5 are among the 10 largest passenger carriers in
the world as of 2005), as well as the largest air courier company in the world (FedEx). During
our sample period 1990-2005, the airlines in our sample account on average for 97.2% of the book
value of all publicly traded airlines in the U.S airline industry. We argue that given their scale
and publicity, concerns about asymmetric information and adverse selection are not likely to play a
major role. Finally, as shown below, by devising asset-speciﬁc measures of collateral characteristics
in the airline industry and using them to analyze the intensive, rather than extensive, margin of
collateral use, we alleviate the standard selection bias that imposes a positive relation between
collateral and loan rates.
Another advantage of using airline debt tranches is that they are typically bankruptcy-remote
and subject to Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy remoteness and section 1110
insulates creditors from the bankruptcy of the issuing airline by relieving creditors from automatic
stay provisions, allowing them to seize and foreclose collateral. These special features of secured
debt in the airline industry reinforce the importance of collateral value for debt ﬁnancing.
2According to Morrell (2001), as of 2000, secured debt accounts for 20% of aircraft ﬁnance, while equity and
unsecured debt account for about 15%.
5The following two predictions emerge from the relation between the cost of borrowing and
the liquidation value of the collateral in studying the intensive margin of collateral in tranches of
secured debt issued by airlines.
Prediction 1. Credit spreads decrease in collateral liquidation values, all else equal.
Prediction 2. Tranche credit ratings improve in collateral liquidation values, all else equal.
The value of collateral aﬀects other facets of debt contracts in addition to credit spreads. Both
the transactions cost approach and the incomplete contracts approach emphasize the role that
collateral value plays in ﬁnancial contracting. The next two predictions about debt capacity and
debt maturity follow from this literature. According to Williamson (1988), Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), Harris and Raviv (1990), and Hart and Moore (1994), the total debt capacity the lender is
willing to supply is increasing in collateral redeployability. We therefore have:
Prediction 3. Loan-to-value ratios increase in collateral liquidation values, all else equal.
Moreover, Hart and Moore (1994) show that asset redeployability increases the durability of the
asset and serves as better collateral for long-term debt. Similarly, Bergl¨ of and von Thadden (1994)
predict that ﬁrms with fungible assets should be ﬁnanced with long-term debt.3 Thus, Prediction
4 states that:
Prediction 4. Tranche maturity increases in collateral liquidation values, all else equal.
Both predictions 3 and 4 stem from the ‘bargaining approach’ to ﬁnancial contracting.4 The
driving force in this approach is the right to foreclose on the debtor’s assets in the case of default.
If the debtor fails to make a promised repayment, the creditor can seize his assets and liquidate
the assets for their market value. The threat to liquidate thus induces the debtor to repay. It is
the liquidation value of the assets, therefore, that determines the allocation of bargaining power
between the creditor and the debtor and the credibility of the liquidation threat. While in this paper
we focus on implications of collateral redeployability to ex-ante tranche characteristics, airlines
often renegotiate the terms of the tranches ex-post. For example, Benmelech and Bergman (2007)
provide evidence that airlines can successfully renegotiate their lease obligations downward when
their ﬁnancial position is suﬃciently poor and when the liquidation value of their ﬂeet is poor.
3See Benmelech (2007) for a discussion of the relation between liquidation values and debt maturity.
4See Hart (1995) for a survey of the literature.
6Thus, while asset redeployability is important for the initial contract, it may also aﬀect the ex-post
determination of contract renegotiation.5
Before presenting our empirical analysis, we describe the airline secured debt market in the next
section.
II. The Airline Equipment Trust Certiﬁcate Market
A. Historical Development
Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates (ETCs) ﬁrst evolved during the 19th century in the American railroad
industry by using railroad rolling stock as collateral.6 Unlike mortgage liens, the legal title for the
rolling stock underlying ETCs was vested with a trustee rather than the railroad. The trustee
would lease the rolling stock back to the railroad while selling the ETCs to investors, using the
lease payments to pay principal and interest on the certiﬁcates. The railroad did not own the
equipment until the certiﬁcates were fully repaid, and if the railroad defaulted, the trustee could
easily foreclose and repossess the rolling stock as the holder of the legal title.
The ﬁrst form of equipment trust certiﬁcates dates back to the ﬁnancing of several locomotives
of the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad in 1839. In 1890, the total dollar value of equipment
certiﬁcates of all steam railways in the U.S. was $49.0 million representing 1.11% of total funded
debt by railroads. In 1924 the total dollar value of equipment certiﬁcates of all steam railways in
the U.S. was $1,057.0 million representing 8.55% of total funded debt by railroads (Street, 1959).
By 1955, equipment certiﬁcates accounted for 26.01% of total debt in the railroad industry with a
total value of $2,589.0 million.
Airline ETC ﬁnancing developed from the railroad equipment certiﬁcates. According to Little-
johns and McGairl (1998), the Bankruptcy Code began to treat aircraft ﬁnancing favorably in 1957,
but it was not until 1979 that Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code and introduced Section
1110 protection which provides creditors relief from the automatic stay. On October 22, 1994, the
Bankruptcy Code was amended, and the rights of creditors under Section 1110 were strengthened.7
The changes in the Bankruptcy Code increased the protection that Section 1110 provided to secured
creditors and reduced the potential threat of legal challenge to secured aircraft.
5Of course, the threat of contract renegotiation feeds also into ex-ante debt contract terms, such as debt pricing.
6This section draws heavily from Littlejohns and McGairl (1998) and Morrell (2001).
7See Littlejohns and McGairl (1998) pages 72-73.
7This legal innovation aﬀected the practice of secured lending in the airline industry. The market
for ETCs expanded and new ﬁnancial innovations such as Enhanced Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates
(EETC) soon became the leading source of external ﬁnancing of aircraft. The ammendments to
Section 1110 led Moody’s to revise its ratings criteria such that securities that were issued after the
enactment date received a rating up to two notches above issuing airlines’ senior unsecured rating.
B. ETC and EETCs
In a traditional ETC a trustee issues equipment trust certiﬁcates to investors and uses the proceeds
to buy the aircraft which is then leased to the airline. The collateral of ETCs typically include only
one or two aircraft. For example, on August, 24, 1990, American Airlines issued an Equipment
Trust Certiﬁcate (1990 Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates, Series P) with a ﬁnal maturity on March,
4, 2014. The certiﬁcates were issued to ﬁnance approximately 77% of the equipment cost of one
Boeing 757-223 (serial number 24583) passenger aircraft, including engines (Rolls-Royce RB211-
535E4B). The proceeds from the ETC issue were $35.5 million, with a serial interest rate of 10.36%
and a credit rating of A (S&P) and A1 (Moody’s).
Economies of scale in issuance costs led airlines with large ﬁnancing needs to the development of
Pass-Through certiﬁcates (PTC), which pool a number of ETCs into a single security that is backed
by a pool of aircraft rather than one. The added security in the form of diversiﬁcation over a pool
of aircraft led to a substantial number of PTC issues in the early 1990s. However, the poor earnings
of airlines during the 1990s led to downgrades of many ETCs and PTCs to below investment grade,
and subsequently to a narrowed investor base and poor liquidity. The next development was a
modiﬁed version of the ETC – the Enhanced Equipment Trust Certiﬁcate. EETC securitization
enhances the creditworthiness of traditional ETCs as follows. First, the issuer of the EETC is
bankruptcy remote. Second, EETCs typically have several tranches with diﬀerent seniority. Third,
a liquidity facility ensures the continued payment of interest on the certiﬁcates for a predetermined
period following a default. The basic structure of an EETC contains several tranches of senior,
mezzanine and subordinated certiﬁcates, with diﬀerent loan-to-value ratios, cross-collateralization
of aircraft, ratings and maturities.
Table 1 presents the characteristics of three EETC issues that are in our sample. There are
three tranches in each of the EETCs in Table 1. For each tranche we report the issue size (in $
million), yield, spreads (in basis points), ﬁnal maturity date, Moody’s and S&P tranche-speciﬁc
8credit rating, cumulative loan-to-value, and collateral description. Cumulative loan-to-value is
deﬁned as the ratio between the sum of the principal amount of that tranche and all tranches
senior to it, divided by an appraisal of the value of the assets serving as collateral. For example,
the cumulative loan-to-value ratio of tranche 1-B of the Fedex 1998-1 issue, which is a mezzanine
tranche, includes the sum of the loans of both the senior tranche (1-A) and the mezzanine tranche
(1-B). Likewise, the cumulative loan-to-value ratio of tranche 1-C of the Fedex 1998-1 issue (0.688),
which is a subordinated tranche, includes the sum of the loan amounts of the senior tranche (1-A),
the mezzanine tranche (1-B), and the subordinated tranche (1-C).
In the ﬁrst EETC in the table (Fedex 1998-1), the most senior tranche (1-A) has a credit rating
of Aa2/AAA, a cumulative loan-to-value ratio of 38.7%, and a credit spread of 125 basis points over
the corresponding treasury. The least senior tranche in the Fedex 1998-1 issue (1-C) has a lower
credit rating (Baa1/BBB+), a higher cumulative loan-to-value ratio (68.8%), and a credit spread
of 155 basis points. All the three tranches of Fedex 1998-1 are secured by the same pool of assets
– 5 McDonnell Douglas MD-11F and 8 Airbus A300F4-605R. Similarly, the most senior tranche
(G) in the second EETC in the table (NWA 1999-3) has a credit rating of Aaa/AAA, a cumulative
loan-to-value ratio of 44.1%, and a credit spread of 170 basis points, while the mezzanine tranche in
the NWA 1999-3 issue (B) has a lower credit rating (Baa2/BBB), a higher cumulative loan-to-value
ratio (61.4%), and a credit spread of 325 basis points. As before, all the three tranches of NWA
1999-3 are secured by the same pool of aircraft – 14 BAE Avro RJ85. Finally, the third EETC in
Table 1 has two senior tranches (G-1 and G-2) and one junior tranche (C). The three tranches of
Delta 2002-1 sum-up together to $1,125.9 million, and are secured by thirty-two Boeing aircraft,
consisting of 17 Boeing 737-832 aircraft, one Boeing 757-232 aircraft, 8 Boeing 767-332ER aircraft,
and 6 Boeing 767-432ER aircraft.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes our data, and provides summary statistics on airline characteristics, tranche
characteristics, the aircraft used as collateral, and aircraft redeployability measures.
A. Sample Construction
Using SDC platinum, we identify all secured bonds, Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates, Pass-Through
Certiﬁcates, and Enhanced Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates issues by ﬁrms with four digit SIC codes
94512 (Scheduled Air Transportation), 4513 (Air Courier Services), and 4522 (Nonscheduled Air
Transport) that were issued between January 1990 and December 2005. This results in 426 debt
tranches out of which 191 are private placements and 235 are issued in U.S. public markets. We
collect all relevant data from SDC platinum such as seniority, size, and credit-spread over the
corresponding treasury at time of issue. The aggregate nominal value of the private placements
and public issues, are $19.8 billion, and $32.1, respectively, totaling $51.9 billion.
We continue by collecting the ﬁling prospectus from EDGAR Plus (R) and from Compact Dis-
closure for each publicly traded tranche identiﬁed by SDC. Since there are no publicly available
prospectuses for private placements, we collect data from AirFinance Journal, an industry peri-
odical, for the private deals. For each public tranche, we obtain the serial number of all aircraft
that were pledged as collateral from the ﬁling prospectus, while for private tranches we obtain the
aircraft model type serving as collateral from AirFinance. We are able to ﬁnd full information
about the aircraft collateral securing the bonds for 198 public tranches and 48 private tranches. To
obtain data on aircraft model type for the public tranches, we match each aircraft serial number
obtained from ﬁling prospectuses to the Ascend CASE airline database, which contains ownership
information, operating information and information on aircraft characteristics for every commercial
aircraft in the world. For each of the 246 tranches, we can thus identify the full portfolio of aircraft
serving as collateral.
B. Tranche and Airline Characteristics
Table 2 describes the sample of secured tranches used in the paper, by issuing airline. There are
246 individual tranches with an aggregate nominal value of $38,096.8 million that were issued by
12 American airlines.8 During the period 1990-1993, 61 tranches with an aggregate book value of
$3,476.1 million were issued by 7 airlines as compared to 108 tranches with an aggregate book value
of $23,742.3 that were issued by 10 airlines between 1998 and 2001. Our sample includes the 10
largest scheduled passenger airlines in the U.S (out of which 5 are among the 10 largest passenger
carriers in the world as of 2005), as well as the largest air courier company in the world (FedEx).
Panel A of Table 3 provides summary statistics for the 246 tranches in our sample. The mean
tranche size is $154.87 million. The largest tranche in our sample was issued in May 2001 by
American Airlines with a nominal value of $1,319.6 million and a collateral pool of 46 aircraft.
8Some of the tranche level variables are not available for all the tranches.
10Each tranche in our sample has, on average, 16.2 aircraft serving as collateral.9 The average credit
spread is 198.8 basis points. While the majority of tranches incorporate ﬁxed-coupon payments,
a few tranches were issued as ﬂoating-rate debt with the spread quoted over the corresponding
Libor rate. For these tranches, we use Bloomberg asset swap calculator (ASW) to calculate the
equivalent ﬁxed rate yield as well as the corresponding credit spread at the issue date. The average
cumulative loan-to-value ratio is 0.616 and the maximum is 0.890 where higher values of cumulative
loan-to-value typically correspond to subordinated tranches. The median S&P tranche credit rating
is BBB+, with a sample-wide minimum rating of B+ and maximum rating of AAA. The median
Moody’s credit rating is Baa2, with a sample-wide minimum rating of B1 and maximum rating of
Aaa. There are at most 4 diﬀerent layers of tranche seniority within an issue, and 14 percent of
the tranches have call provisions. Further, private placements account for 17 percent of tranche
issues. Finally, tranches in our sample have an average maturity of 15.4 years with a maximum of
25 years.
Panel B of Table 3 provides summary statisticsfor the issuing airlines. The size, measured as the
book value of assets, of the average airline in our sample is approximately $10 billion. The average
airline market to book ratio is 1.19,10 while their average proﬁtability and leverage are 11.7% and
39%, respectively.11 Finally, the median airline has a credit rating of BB-, with a sample-wide
minimum rating of B- and a maximum rating of A, reﬂecting the industry downturns during the
early and mid 1990s and the period that followed September, 2001. As would be expected, credit
ratings of debt collateralized by aircraft are far superior to those of issuing airlines as a whole.
C. Redeployability Measures
We measure the redeployability of aircrafts by exploiting aircraft model heterogeneity. Our ap-
proach to measuring redeployability is motivated by the industry equilibrium model of Shleifer and
Vishny (1992), and is similar to the empirical approach developed in Benmelech (2007) for 19th
century American railroads, and Benmelech and Bergman (2007) and Gavazza (2006) for airlines.
In order to reduce costs associated with operating diﬀerent aircraft types, airlines tend to
9As Table 1 demonstrates, the same aircraft can be used as collateral for more than one tranche in an EETC issue.
10Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity [Compustat Annual Items 24*25]+book value of assets
[Compustat Annual Item 6] minus the book value of equity [Compustat Annual Items 60] all over the book value of
assets [Compustat Annual Item 6].
11Proﬁtability is deﬁned as [Compustat Annual Item 13] over assets [Compustat Annual Item 6], and leverage is
deﬁned as [Compustat Annual Items 9+34+84] divided by total assets [Compustat Annual Item 6].
11operate a limited number of aircraft models. Therefore, potential secondary market buyers of any
given type of aircraft are prone to be airlines already operating the same type of aircraft. The
notion that the number of potential buyers and the ‘popularity’ of an aircraft model are important
determinants of the redeployability of aircraft is supported by industry participants and analysts.
According to Littlejohns and McGairl (1998), the ease of remarketing an aircraft is an important
determinant of expected collateral value and that, “[a]n aircraft with a large number in current use
across a wide array of users will obviously be easier to resell or re-lease than an aircraft of limited
production and usage.”12 Similarly, the prospectus supplement of Pass-Through Certiﬁcates issued
by Federal Express describe the factors that aﬀect the marketability of an aircraft:
Marketability of Aircraft. It is impossible to predict the resale value for any Aircraft to
be sold upon the exercise of the Indenture Trustee’s remedies under the related Indenture.
The market for aircraft, whether new or used, is and will be aﬀected by many factors
including, among other things, the supply of similarly equipped aircraft of the same make
and model, the demand for such aircraft by air carriers and the cost and availability of
ﬁnancing to potential purchasers of such aircraft.13
Table 4 provides a breakdown of all aircraft in our sample, by aircraft type. Our sample includes
1,086 individual aircraft serving as collateral, representing 22 diﬀerent aircraft types. The most
prevalent type of collateral aircraft in our sample is the Boeing 737 (NG) (222 aircraft), followed
by the Airbus A319 (144 aircraft), and Boeing 757 (141 aircraft). The least popular aircraft in our
sample are BAE Jetstream 31/S3, Saab 340, and Bombardier Dash 8, with 2 aircraft each. While
Boeing 737 (CFMI) is the most popular aircraft in the world, it is under-represented in the pool
of aircraft used as a collateral for these deals. The reason for this under-representation is that the
sample in our paper does not cover the whole market for used aircraft, but rather the sample of
aircraft that were used as collateral by major U.S. airlines during the period 1990-2005.
Using the Ascend CASE database, we construct three redeployability measures using the same
method as in Benmelech and Bergman (2007). We begin by constructing redeployabilitymeasures at
the yearly level for each aircraft type, where aircraft type is deﬁned using the aircraft type category
in the Ascend CASE database. To do so, we compute for every sample-year 1) the number of aircraft
per type; 2) the number of operators per type, and 3) the number of operators who operate at least
12Littlejohns and McGairl (1998) page 81.
13Source: Federal Express Corp. Prospectus Supplement, November 26, 1993.
125 aircraft per type. In calculating these measures, we disregard airlines who are in bankruptcy
using the SDC bankruptcy database, as their ﬁnancial position most likely precludes them from
serving as potential aircraft buyers.14 This process yields three redeployability measures for each
aircraft-type and each sample-year. The last three columns in Table 4 report the time-series mean
of each of the 3 redeployability series during the period 1990-2005. The aircraft type with the
largest number of operators that were not subject to Chapter 7 or Chapter-11 of the Bankruptcy
Code is the Boeing 737 (CFMI). This aircraft was operated by an average of 162.9 operators, of
which 66 had more than 5 such aircraft. The aircraft type with the smallest number of operators
in our sample is the Embraer EMB-120 with an average of only 31.2 aircraft, 5 operators and 1.3
operators with more than 5 aircraft.
To construct the redeployability measures for a portfolio of aircraft serving as collateral for
a particular tranche, we simply aggregate the aircraft-type redeployability measures across all
aircraft in the portfolio. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the redeployability of the collateral-portfolio to
be the weighted average of the redeployability index corresponding to each of the aircraft in the
portfolio. In calculating the ﬁrst redeployability measure, since we want to account for the residual
demand for the aircraft in each ﬂeet, we do not include each airline’s own aircraft. Likewise, in our
number-of-operators based proxies we subtract the airline for which we calculate the measure. We
calculate in this manner three measures of ﬂeet redeployability corresponding to each of the three

























where i is a tranche, t is sample year, s denotes an aircraft type, and ωi,t,s is deﬁned as





14As robustness we run all regressions using redeployability measures that do not exclude bankrupt airlines. The
results are qualitatively unchanged.
13We use the number of seats in an aircraft model as a proxy for its size (and value) in our weighted
average calculations. We use the number of seats since we have appraised values of aircrafts for
only about 60% of the aircraft in our sample. Also, according to Littlejohns and McGairl (1998):
“(T)he exact appraisal value of aircraft involved in a securitization is not vital because the rating
agencies recognize that the value will change from the outset of the deal. They do, however,
take into consideration whether the secondary market is at a cyclical high or low.” In contrast to
current appraised aircraft value, our aircraft-type based measures serve to capture the long-term
redeployability of an aircraft, while placing less weight on current market conditions and prices.
Panel A of Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for our three redeployability measures. As
can be seen, the redeployability measure based on number of aircraft has an average value of 958.6
aircraft operated by airlines that are not subject to Chapter 7 or Chapter-11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Furthermore, on average, there are 118.7 potential non-bankrupt buyers for aircraft serving
as collateral for secured tranche issue. When we measure redeployability using potential buyers
with at least ﬁve aircraft, there are only 40.2 potential buyers on average (median of 27). Panel B of
Table 5 lists examples of tranches, their collateral, and the corresponding redeployability measures.
Northwestern NWA-1999 tranches G, B, and C have the least redeployable aircraft pool in our
sample. Secured by 14 BAE SYSTEMS RJ85 Avroliner aircraft, there were only 72 aircrafts of
this type on the issue date, with only 3 solvent operators with more than 5 aircraft. In contrast,
the collateral of Southwest 1996 A1 and A2 tranches is among the most redeployable pools in our
sample – secured by 6 Boeing 737-300 aircraft that have 112 potential buyers that operate more
than 5 aircraft. Panel B also shows that the pool of aircraft that is used as collateral for ETCs,
PTCs, or EETCs often includes multiple aircraft types. The Delta 2000-1 tranches A2, B, and C
are secured by 20 Boeing 737-832, 18 Boeing 757-232, and 6 B767-332ER, resulting in 63 potential
buyers that operate more than 5 aircraft.
IV. Empirical Analysis
This section presents the empirical analysis of the relation between aircraft redeployability and
credit spread and tranche rating, as well as cumulative loan-to-value ratios and tranche maturity.
Our theoretical predictions stem from the observation that, all else equal, when debt is secured by
collateral with greater expected liquidation values, creditors bear less downside risk in the event of
14default. Rather than relying only on the promised payments by the ﬁrm to generate a return on
their original investment, creditors can sell the collateralized assets and redeploy them elsewhere
to a diﬀerent user. Hence redeployability should be negatively related to tranche credit spreads,
positively related to tranche credit ratings, and should be associated with higher debt capacity and
longer-term debt.
To test redeployability’simpact on credit characteristics, and establish its economic signiﬁcance,
we relate our three measures of tranche-collateral redeployability to the tranche credit spread, to
the tranche S&P and Moody’s credit rating, as well as to cumulative loan-to-value ratios and
tranche maturity. Because all of the tranches in our sample employ aircraft as collateral, our tests
rely on examining the eﬀect of the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin of collateral
use. Put diﬀerently, we are analyzing the eﬀect of variation in collateral redeployability levels on
tranche characteristics, rather than the eﬀect of having collateral at all on these characteristics.
By doing so, we alleviate the selection bias that is present in a number of previous studies which
utilize variation in the extensive margin to analyze the eﬀect of collateral on loan prices (see e.g.,
Berger and Udell, 1990). As described above, these studies tend to ﬁnd a positive relation between
a debt issue employing collateral and its yield, a fact that is interpreted as suggesting that only
relatively low risk ﬁrms can borrow using non-collateralized loans. The selection bias involved in
the collateralization decision tends, therefore, to mask the actual relation between collateral values
and loan characteristics.
A. Airline Risk and the Endogeneity of the Redeployability Measures
One potential eﬀect which would lead our results to underestimate the actual eﬀect of collateral
values on credit spreads is a selection eﬀect similar in spirit to that documented in previous lit-
erature. If higher default-risk ﬁrms are required not only to pledge collateral, but also to pledge
collateral of greater redeployability, increases in our redeployability measures would, in part, proxy
for increases in airline default risk. It should be noted, however, that such a selection bias along
the intensive margin will work against our ﬁnding support for the hypotheses in Section I: if riskier
airlines are required to post better collateral, increased collateral redeployability will have a more
negative impact on credit spreads than that estimated by our regressions. Similarly, increased
collateral redeployability will have a more positive eﬀect on improved credit ratings, loan-to-value
ratios and debt maturities than that estimated in our regressions.
15Although a selection bias along the intensive margin works against our ﬁnding support for the
hypotheses, its existence is ultimately an empirical question. In Table A1 in the appendix we test
the hypothesis that aircraft redeployability is correlated with airline default risk. We regress each
of our three tranche redeployability measures on variables that capture the ﬁnancial status of an
airline: size, proﬁtability, leverage, interest coverage and the S&P long-term credit rating. All
regressions include year ﬁxed-eﬀects and standard errors are clustered by airline. To alleviate a
multicollinearity concern, we include each of the regressors individually in Panel A through Panel
C of Table A1 for each of the redeployability measures. We also test a multivariate speciﬁcation
in which all the explanatory variables are included. As can be seen, we ﬁnd that none of the
explanatory variables are statistically signiﬁcant in explaining aircraft redeployability, and together
they are not jointly signiﬁcant, as the F-test reveals. Since airline risk is clearly correlated with
each of the explanatory variables, and in particular with the airline credit rating, we conclude
that airline risk is not correlated with aircraft redeployability. Thus, a selection bias in which
higher default-risk ﬁrms are required to pledge collateral of greater redeployability is not supported
by the data. Moreover, later on in our regressions we include airline characteristics and airlines
ﬁxed-eﬀects to control for airline heterogeneity that potentially drives aircraft redeployability.
B. Redeployability and Credit Spreads
We begin with a simple test of Hypothesis 1 which predicts a negative relation between redeploya-
bility and credit spreads. We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Spreadi,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct +  i,a,t, (1)
where Spread is the tranche credit spread above the corresponding treasury yield on the issue date,
subscripts indicate tranche (i), airline (a), and year (t), Redeployability is one of our three measures
of the redeployability of the aircraft portfolio serving as collateral for each tranche, Xi,a,t is a vector
of tranche covariates, Za,t is a vector of airline controls, ct is a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects, and  i,a,t
is the regression residual. The tranche covariates include the seniority of the tranche, the log of the
tranche size (in $ million), a dummy variable that equals one if the tranche is callable, a dummy
variable that equals one for private placements, and the maturity (in years) of each tranche.15 The
issuing airline control variables are the airline’s size, market to book ratio, proﬁtability, and the
15We do not control for loan-to-value in these regressions since we do not have loan-to-value data for all the tranches
in our data. We later control for loan-to-value in Table 12 for robustness.
16airline S&P credit rating. Airline control variables are calculated as of the beginning-of-year t hence
the lagged t subscript. Regressions are run under OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered
by airline and reported in parenthesis.
We report the results from estimating regression 1 in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 6. In the
last three columns of Table 6 we include both year and airlines ﬁxed-eﬀects. Thus we estimate the
following speciﬁcation:
Spreadi,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct + ba + υi,a,t, (2)
where ba is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, υi,a,t is the regression residual, and all other control
variables are deﬁned as in regression (1).
We ﬁnd that after controlling for tranche characteristics and aircraft controls, and both year
and airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, higher redeployability is associated with lower credit spreads. This eﬀect
is economically sizeable. In the speciﬁcation without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, moving from the 25th
percentile to the 75th percentile in our redeployability measures is associated with a decrease in
the spread that is between 21.6 and 23.7 basis points, representing an 11 percent decrease relative
to the mean spread. Adding airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, and thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
in airline characteristics, strengthens the economic magnitudes of the eﬀect of redeployability, with
a 25th to 75th percentile movement in the redeployability measures reducing spreads by between
52.2 and 64.2 basis points. This represents a decrease of between 26.3 and 32.3 percent of the mean
spread. To facilitate comparison of economic magnitudes across measures, Panel A of Table 11
summarizes the economic impact of redeployability on credit spreads.
We have also tried alternative measures of redeployability such as the weighted average age
of the aircraft used as collateral, and the noise level of the aircraft (not reported). However, our
sample does not exhibit much variation in aircraft age and noise levels, and thus these measures
do not show up to be statistically signiﬁcant in our analysis. Most of the aircraft in our sample are
new – the average age of the aircraft in the collateral pool is 1.3 years and the median is 0.0 – and
likewise, most of the aircraft in our sample meet the FAA FAR Part 36 Stage 3 noise requirement.
Turning to the coeﬃcients of the control variables in Table 6, we ﬁnd as expected that tranches
with higher seniority have lower credit spreads, with a one notch increase in seniority reducing
spreads by approximately 54 basis points.16 Further, we ﬁnd that private placements are associated
16As a reminder, our deﬁnition of tranche seniority assigns a value of 1 to the highest ranked tranche.
17with higher credit spreads – consistent with either lower risk bearing capacity on the part of
investors or with increased fear of renegotiation amongst private placements. Callable tranches
have higher spreads than those without a call provision, which is to be expected given that the
call provision retained by the ﬁrm has value. Both the maturity and size of the tranche do not
appear to be statistically related to credit spreads. We have tried (results not reported for brevity)
interacting seniority with our measures of redeployability – assuming that for more junior tranches
redeployability should be more important. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are indeed
negative as predicted implying that redeployability reduces credit spreads more for junior tranches.
However, the interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant
We ﬁnd that airline size is negatively related to spreads in the speciﬁcation without airline ﬁxed
eﬀects, while it is positively related to credit spreads in the time-series once airline ﬁxed eﬀects are
added. Airline market-to-book ratios are positively related to spreads when airline ﬁxed-eﬀects are
included, but there is no statistically signiﬁcant relation when the speciﬁcation does not include
airline ﬁxed eﬀects. As would be expected, airline proﬁtability is consistently negatively related to
spreads. The marginal eﬀect of proﬁtability is large: a one standard deviation increase in airline
proﬁtability decreases tranche credit spreads by approximately 30 basis points in the speciﬁcation
without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects and approximately 55 basis points in the speciﬁcation with airline
ﬁxed eﬀects, representing 15 and 28 percent of the mean spread in the sample. Finally, while the
point estimates of the coeﬃcients on airline S&P credit rating are positive, indicating a negative
relation between airline credit rating and spreads, the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in the speciﬁcations
with airline ﬁxed eﬀects, and only marginally signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcations without airline ﬁxed
eﬀects (t − statistic=1.77).
C. Credit Spreads and Collateral Redeployability in Industry Downturns
In this subsection we examine whether airline industry-wide conditions aﬀect the relation between
collateralredeployabilityand credit spreads.17 FollowingShleifer and Vishny (1992), we hypothesize
that the negative relation between redeployability and credit spreads should be stronger during
times when the industry is doing poorly, as during these times, the ability to easily redeploy assets
of failing ﬁrms will be particularly important. In contrast, it might be relatively easy to ﬁnd buyers
even for low redeployability aircraft during industry booms.
17We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the empirical tests in this section.
18To test the eﬀect of industry wide conditions on credit spreads we use two proxies for the
industry health: i) the weighted average airline proﬁtability, and ii) the weighted average airline
market to book. Figure 1 displays the evolution of our measures of the state of the airline industry
over our sample period. As Figure 1 illustrates, industry condition (as measured by our two proxies)
peaked during 1997, then deteriorated until 2001-2002, and has recently slightly improved.18 As
a ﬁrst step, we include a control for industry wide conditions in regression 2 which relates credit
spreads to collateral redeployability. Since industry wide conditions are equal for all airlines in a
given year, year ﬁxed eﬀects are not included in these speciﬁcations. The results are shown in Table
7.
As would be expected, we ﬁnd a negative relation between spreads and the general health of
the airline industry, as proxied by proﬁtability and market to book ratios. Further, as can be seen
in the table, the negative relation between collateral redeployability and credit spreads continues
to hold even after controlling for industry condition. Indeed, comparing the coeﬃcients on our
three measures of redeployability in Table 7 to those in Table 6, shows that this eﬀect is larger
when industry health controls are included and yearly ﬁxed eﬀects are excluded.19 For example,
controlling for industry proﬁtability, a 25th to 75th percentile movement in the number of aircraft
redeployability measure reduces spreads by approximately 110 basis points.
To test the industry downturn hypothesis, i.e. that the negative relation between redeploya-
bility and credit spreads should be stronger during times when the industry is doing poorly, we
add an interaction term between the measures of airline industry health and each of our three
redeployability measures. Our speciﬁcation is the following:
Spreadi,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + Industryt−1 + Redeployabilityi,a,t × Industryt−1
+ Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ba + υi,a,t, (3)
where Spread is the tranche credit spread above the corresponding treasury yield on the issue
date for tranche (i), airline (a), and year (t), Redeployability is one of our three measures of the
redeployability of the aircraft portfolio serving as collateral for each tranche, Industry is one of
our two weighted average measures of aggregate industry condition, Xi,a,t is the standard vector of
18While September 11 2001 was an exogenous shock to the airline industry leading to deterioration of airlines’
proﬁtability and valuation, our sample includes only 16 tranches that were issued after September 2001, and thus we
cannot fully exploit this shock.
19This suggests that the year ﬁxed eﬀects are capturing temporal variation not captured by our measures of industry
health reducing the impact of tranche redeployability.
19tranche covariates, Za,t is a vector of airline controls, and ba is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects. The
speciﬁcation does not include year ﬁxed eﬀects as we are identifying oﬀ of changes in the industry
state over time. Regressions are run under OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered by airline
and reported in parenthesis.
We present the results from estimating regression 3 in Table 8. For expositional brevity, the
table includes only the coeﬃcients on the redeployabilitymeasures, the industry condition variables,
and the interactionterms. As can be seen from the table, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that the
eﬀect of increased redeployability in reducing credit spreads is concentrated during times of relative
poor industry performance. Focusing on columns 1-3 of the table, while the coeﬃcient on the
level eﬀect of redeployability are negative (essentially measuring the eﬀect of redeployability at an
industry proﬁtability of zero), the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms between the redeployability
measures and the weighted average of airline proﬁtability are consistently positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.20 The economic signiﬁcance of the overall eﬀect is large. To measure this eﬀect we
calculate the 25th and 75th percentile of industry proﬁtability and industry market to book using
two diﬀerent methods. In the ﬁrst method we simply calculate the inter-quartile range using only
the time-series variation between 1990 and 2005. The second method calculates the 25th and
75th percentiles employing the entire panel data for industry conditions, and thus, while using
the same variation in the time-series, this method places more weight on years with more tranche
observations. Therefore, while the ﬁrst method uses simple inter-quartile statistics, the second
method uses tranche-weighted inter-quartile statistics.
Focusing on the ﬁrst measure of redeployability and calculating industry percentiles using non-
weighted inter-quartile statistics, we ﬁnd that when average industry proﬁtability is at the 25
percentile level (3.98 percent), moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of the number of aircraft
redeployability measure decreases spreads by 155.7 basis points.21 In contrast, when average indus-
try proﬁtabilityis at the 75 percentile level (13.36 percent), moving from the 25th to 75th percentile
of redeployability decreases spreads by only 101.2 basis points.22 Thus spreads are more sensitive
to collateral redeployability during industry downturns. Calculating percentiles using the weighted
20One of the interaction coeﬃcients is marginally signiﬁcant with a t − statistic of 1.67.
21In calculating these eﬀects we measure the total diﬀerential taking into account both the levels and the interaction
terms.
22As would be expected, the economic magnitude of a 25th to 75th percentile movement in a redeployability
measure implied in Table 7 lies in between the economic magnitudes of the same eﬀect calculated at the 25th and
75th percentiles of industry proﬁtability.
20inter-quartile statistics shows that a 25th to 75th percentile movement in collateral redeployability
reduces spreads by 130 basis points when average industry proﬁtability is at the 25 percentile level
(8.4 percent), while the same movement at the 75th percentile of industry proﬁtability (15 percent)
reduces spreads by 91.7 basis points.
The results using the industry average market to book proxy are similar, although one of the
three interaction coeﬃcients is not statistically signiﬁcant. Again, focusing on the ﬁrst measure of
redeployability and calculating industry market to book percentiles using the non-weighted inter-
quartile statistics shows that when average industry market to book is at the 25th percentile
(average market to book = 1.08), a 25th to 75th percentile movement in collateral redeployability
decreases spreads by 136.9 basis points, while when average industry market to book is at the
75th percentile level (average market to book = 1.23), a 25th to 75th percentile movement in
redeployability decreases spreads by 110.5 basis points.23
D. Redeployability and Credit Ratings
We now turn to Hypothesis 2 and analyze the relation between the redeployability of collateral and
credit ratings. Given the ordinal discrete nature of the dependent variable and similar to Blume,
Lim and Mackinlay (1998) we employ an ordered probit model. This model relates credit ratings to
observed airline and tranche characteristics through unobserved threshold parameters. The credit
rating categories are mapped into a partition of the unobserved threshold parameters range, where
the partition is a linear function of the observed explanatory variables.
We assign numeric values to the credit rating categories of Moody’s (S&P), with a credit rating
of Aaa (AAA) assigned a value of 1, a rating of Aa1 (AA+) assigned a value of 2, all the way to a
rating of C (which is the lowest credit rating in the Moody’s scale) that is assigned a value of 21,
and a rating of D (which is the lowest credit rating in the S&P scale) that is assigned a value of
22. We deﬁne Tranche rating
M,S
i,a,t as either the Moody’s (M) or S&P (S) numeric value assigned
to the credit rating of tranche i of airline a at time t.
Table 9 reports the results from estimating the ordered probit model by maximum likelihood.
Detailed description of the ordered probit procedure are provided in the Appendix. The coeﬃcients
in Table 9 do not represent marginal eﬀects. The direction of the marginal eﬀects of the explanatory
23The equivalent eﬀects when using the entire panel to calculate industry market to book percentiles, i.e. the
weighted inter-quartile statistics, are 142.3 and 114 basis points.
21variables are unambiguously determined by the sign of the coeﬃcients in Table 9 only for the highest
and lowest ordered response – i.e. Pr(Tranche rating
M,S
i,a,t =1 |X), Pr(Tranche ratingM
i,a,t =2 1 |X),
and Pr(Tranche ratingS
i,a,t =2 2 |X).24 Thus, we ﬁrst discuss the direction of the eﬀects of the
explanatory variables in Table 9 on the probability that a tranche will be rated AAA by S&P (or
alternatively Aaa by Moody’s).25
As Table 9 shows, senior tranches are more likely to be rated AAA/Aaa. In addition, we
ﬁnd that larger tranches are more likely to be rated AAA by S&P ratings, but are not statistically
signiﬁcant in explaining Moody’s rating. Callable tranches are less likely to be AAA/Aaa rated and
tranche maturity does not seem to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on being rated AAA/Aaa.
We also control for three airline characteristics in explaining the tranche credit rating: size, market-
to-book, and proﬁtability. We ﬁnd that tranches of larger airlines, and those of airlines with higher
market-to-book are more likely to be AAA/Aaa rated.
Focusing on the relation between credit rating and collateral Table 9 shows that the probability
that a tranche will be rated AAA by S&P or Aaa by Moody’s is consistently positively related to our
measures of collateral redeployability. Thus, consistent with our second hypothesis, credit rating
agencies appear to take collateral redeployability into account when determining debt quality, with
higher redeployability measures associated with improved tranche credit ratings. We measure the
marginal eﬀects of collateral redeployability on the probability that a tranche will be rated AA+,
A and BBB+ and report the economic magnitudes in Panel B of Table 11. As Table 11 shows,
a one standard deviation move in the number of aircraft redeployability measure increases the
probability that a tranche will have a AA+ credit rating by 2 percentage points, representing an
increase of 25.6% relative to the sample mean, and reduces the probability that a tranche will have
a BBB+ credit rating by 1 percentage point, representing a decrease of 6.9% relative to the sample
mean.26 Similarly, increases in our other measures of redeployability – the number of operators
redeployability measure, and the number of operators with more than ﬁve aircraft of similar type
– are also associated with higher credit ratings.
24See Wooldrige 2001, page 506.
25Put diﬀerently, we are analyzing ∂Prob[rating = AAA/Aaa]/∂xi.
26As discussed above, given the shape of the probability function, the eﬀect of an independent variable on the
probability of the dependent variable being in a particular bin is non-monotonic in the ranking of the bin.
22E. Redeployability, Loan-to-value and Tranche Maturity
In this section we analyze the relation between collateral redeployability and both loan-to-value
ratios and debt maturity. We begin by testing Hypothesis 3 which states that more redeployable
collateral supports higher debt capacity using loan-to value ratio as our dependent variable. In test-
ing Hypothesis 3, we use two baseline speciﬁcations: i) tranche level, and ii) issue level regressions.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we calculate the cumulative loan-to value ratio for every tranche. The
second speciﬁcation deﬁnes a loan-to-value ratio for each issue as the ratio between the aggregate
principal amount of all the tranches within an issue to the appraised collateral value.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we estimate the following regression:
LTV T
i,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct + ba + υi,a,t, (4)
where LTV T is the tranche cumulative loan-to-value ratio of tranche (i), airline (a), and year (t).
Redeployability is one of our three measures of the redeployability of the aircraft portfolio serving as
collateral for each tranche, Xi,a,t is a vector of tranche covariates, Za,t is a vector of airline controls,
ct is a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects, ba is a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, and  i,a,t is the regression
residual. Regressions are run under OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered by airline and
reported in parenthesis.
The second speciﬁcation we estimate is given by:
LTV I
j,a,t = Redeployabilityj,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct + ba + υj,a,t, (5)
where LTV I is the issue loan-to-value ratio of issue (j), airline (a), and year (t). Since this speciﬁ-
cation is run at the issue levelh, it does not include tranche covariates as controls.
It should be noted that tranche characteristics such as loan-to-value, maturity, call provisions,
and tranche size are endogenous and jointly determined at the time of the issue. Thus, ideally, one
would like to utilize an instrumental variable approach to estimate the economic impact of each
of these variables. However, since these debt facets are jointly determined, this complicates the
use of an instrumental variable. Nevertheless, our speciﬁcations allow us to understand the cross
correlations between asset redeployability and tranche characteristics in the data.27
The results of regressions (4) and (5) are reported in columns 1 through 6 of Table 10. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3, we ﬁnd a robust positive relation between loan-to-value ratios and collateral
27See Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2005, and Qian and Strahan, 2007, for similar approaches.
23redeployability both at the tranche level and the issue level. Collateral pools with higher asset
redeployability are associated with higher debt capacity. The coeﬃcients of the redeployability
measures in the two speciﬁcations are quite similar, although the coeﬃcients in the issue-level
speciﬁcation have higher statistical signiﬁcance, reﬂecting the debt capacity of the entire collateral
pool.28 The economic signiﬁcance implied by the coeﬃcients are sizable. Moving from the 25th
to 75th percentile of our redeployability measures increases loan-to-value ratios by between 9 and
13 percentage points. This corresponds to an increase of between 14 and 21 percent of the mean
tranche loan-to-value ratio, and between 13 and 19 percent of the mean issue loan-to-value ratio.
Panel C of Table 11 summarizes the economic impact of redeployability on debt capacity across
redeployability measures. Senior tranches have lower loan-to values by construction; a decrease
of one level of tranche seniority increases cumulative loan-to-value ratios by 10 percentage points.
Finally, at the issue-level speciﬁcation (columns 4 - 6), we ﬁnd that higher airline market to book
ratios and worse S&P airline credit ratings are associated with lower loan-to-value ratios. Similar to
our previous analysis, we also examine whether airline industry-wide conditions aﬀect the relation
between collateral redeployability and loan-to-value ratios but we ﬁnd no evidence that industry
conditions aﬀect loan-to-value ratios.
We next turn to test the relation between asset redeployability and debt maturity. We estimate
regression 6 below at the tranche level and not at the issue level since diﬀerent tranches within the
same issue have diﬀerent maturities (see Table 1).
Maturityi,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct + ba + υi,a,t, (6)
where Maturityi,a,t is the maturity of tranche i of airline a in year t. All control variable are
deﬁned as in regression 5. The results are presented in columns 7 through 9 of Table 10. While
we ﬁnd that lower seniority tranches are associated with shorter maturities, we do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant relation between redeployability and tranche maturity. Thus, the evidence
in our sample of airline asset backed securities does not support Hypothesis 4. Our results diﬀer
from the ﬁndings in Benmelech (2007), and Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005), which
ﬁnd that higher liquidation values are associated with longer-term debt. One potential explanation
for why maturity is not correlated with redeployability in our paper is that senior tranches tend to
have longer maturities than mezzanine or subordinated tranches. The average maturity of senior
28We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this test and its interpretation.
24tranches is 17.1 years compared to 13.9 years in mezzanine tranches and 10.5 in junior tranches.
If creditors are willing to supply long-term debt only when their tranches are senior, and if our
seniority control variable does not fully control for this, it is possible that the seniority eﬀect will
dominate redeployability in determining tranche maturity. Moreover, both Benmelech (2007), and
Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) study ‘balloon loans’ that require substantial principal
payment at the end of the term of the loan – which is consistent with models of debt maturity
that assume zero-coupon debt. However, similar to residential mortgages, EETCs are amortized
and hence most of the principal of the loan is already paid by the time of the legal maturity date.
In summary, while we do not ﬁnd a relation between tranche maturity and asset redeployability
in our sample, these results may be speciﬁc to EETCs or other debt instruments with amortized
payments.
F. Redeployability and Credit Spreads Controlling for LTV
Having shown that loan-to-value ratios are increasing in our measures of collateral redeployability
and are hence endogenous, we now examine whether the relation between tranche credit spreads
continues to hold even after controlling for tranche loan-to-value. Since asset redeployability may
increase debt capacity, our redeployabilitymeasures may be capturing, in part, variationsin leverage
ratios, which in turn have a direct eﬀect on credit spreads. Since increased loan-to-value ratios tend
to increase credit spreads, our previous estimates of the impact of redeployability on credit spreads
may be underestimated (i.e. Harris and Raviv, 1990). We thus estimate the following regression:
Spreadi,a,t = Redeployabilityi,a,t + LTVi,a,t + Xi,a,t + Za,t−1 + ct + ba + ξi,a,t, (7)
where Spread is the tranche credit spread above the corresponding treasury yield on the issue date,
Redeployability is one of our three measures of the redeployability of the aircraft portfolio serving
as collateral for each tranche, LTV is the tranche cumulative loan-to-value ratio, Xi,a,t is a vector
of tranche covariates, Za,t is a vector of airline controls, ct is a vector of year ﬁxed-eﬀects, ba is
a vector of airline ﬁxed-eﬀects (included in the last three columns of the table), and ξi,a,t is the
regression residual. Regressions are run under OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered by
airline and reported in parenthesis. Since we do not have tranche loan-to-value ratios for all the
tranches in our data, our number of observations drops to 203.
We report the resultsfrom estimatingregression7 in Table 12. First, we ﬁnd that when including
25airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, increased loan-to value is associated with higher tranche credit spreads. The
economic magnitude of the eﬀect is quite large, with a standard deviation increase in cumulative
loan-to-value ratios increasing credit spreads by between 51 and 54 basis points in the speciﬁcation
with airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, representing 26 percent of the mean spread. While having the right
sign, cumulative loan-to-value is not statistically signiﬁcant in determining credit spreads when
airline ﬁxed eﬀects are not included. The coeﬃcients on the other control variables in Table 12 are
consistent with our previous ﬁndings.
As Table 12 demonstrates, collateral redeployability is consistently negatively related to credit
spreads, even after controlling for tranche cumulative loan-to-value ratios. As expected, since debt
capacity should be positively related to collateralredeployability, controllingfor cumulative loan-to-
value ratios generally increases the economic and statistical signiﬁcance of our results as compared
to those found in Table 6. We ﬁnd that in the speciﬁcation without airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, moving
from the 25th to the 75th percentile in our three redeployability measures reduces tranche credit
spreads by approximately 20 basis points, representing a decrease of 10 percent relative to the mean
spread. Controlling for airline ﬁxed eﬀects increases the economic signiﬁcance of this result, with
a 25th to 75th percentile movement in the redeployability measures reducing spreads by between
106 and 126 basis points, representing between 53 and 63 percent of the mean spread.
It should be noted that, as argued earlier, even these estimates of the eﬀect of redeployability
on credit spreads may be understated. Since credit spreads in our sample are calculated as of the
issue date of the secured debt, the value of collateral is priced based on the expected probability
of liquidation at the time of issue. As the probability of default and liquidation increase, the eﬀect
of redeployability on prices will increase. Put diﬀerently, for the many airlines which post ETC or
EETC issue experienced ﬁnancial distress, the estimates in Table 12 represent a lower bound on
the eﬀect of redeployability on subsequent credit spreads.29
V. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of collateral on the cost of debt capital and other aspects of
debt ﬁnancing. Theories based on borrower moral hazard and limited pledgeable income predict
that collateral increases the availability of credit and reduces its price by limiting the downside
29Unfortunately, since we do not have data on yields in the secondary market, we cannot test this prediction
directly.
26risk born by creditors. Upon default, creditors can obtain at least a portion of the return on their
investment through the repossession and liquidation of pledged collateral.
Testing these theories is complicated by the very selection problem which they imply: creditors
will demand collateral precisely from those borrowers who are riskier. This selection problem leads
to a positive relation in the data between the presence of collateral and loan yields. Analyzing the
extensive margin of collateral use, therefore, masks the hypothesized negative impact that collateral
exhibits on debt yields.
We analyze the intensive, rather than extensive, margin of collateral use. We assemble a novel
data set of secured credit issued by U.S. airlines which use aircraft as collateral. We proxy for
the ease at which creditors will be able to liquidate collateral upon default by constructing mea-
sures of aircraft redeployability. We then test the relation between collateral redeployability and
credit spreads, credit rating, loan-to-value ratios, and debt maturity, and estimate its economic
signiﬁcance.
We ﬁnd a negative relation between tranche credit spreads and expected collateral values.
Increased aircraft redeployability is thus associated with cheaper credit as creditors’ downside risk
upon default is reduced. This eﬀect is especially pronounced during periods of industry downturns.
Our results also show that debt tranches that are secured by more redeployable collateral exhibit
higher Moody’s and S&P credit ratings as well as higher loan-to-value ratios. We ﬁnd no relation
between redeployability and debt maturity. Taken together, our results suggest that the ability to
pledge collateral, and in particular, collateral which is more redeployable, eases ﬁnancial frictions,
lowers the cost of external ﬁnancing and increases debt capacity.
27Table A1
Redeployability and Airline Characteristics
The dependent variable in the regressions is one of three redeployability measures: Redeployability (aircraft) is the number
of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the
number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Airline size is the logarithm of the book value of airline assets.
Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over assets. Leverage is deﬁned as total debt divided by total assets. Interest
coverage is deﬁned as operating earnings before depreciation divided by interest expense. S&P Airline Credit Rating is the
airline long-term credit rating. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Also reported are
the p-values of F-tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables (excluding year ﬁxed-eﬀects). t-statistics are
calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Redeployability (# of aircraft)






Interest Coverage 386.33 208.80
(1.03) (0.76)
S&P Airline -107.11 -107.56
Credit Rating (-1.05) (-1.20)
F-test (p-value) 0.407
Adjusted R
2 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.340
Observations 225 225 223 225 225 225
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Redeployability (# of operators)






Interest Coverage 53.84 38.07
(1.28) (1.19)
S&P Airline -12.58 -10.61
Credit Rating (-1.08) (-0.98)
F-test (p-value) 0.339
Adjusted R
2 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.29
Observations 225 245 225 225 225 225
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Redeployability (# of operators with > 5a i r c r a f t )






Interest Coverage 15.97 0.06
(1.17) (0.91)
S&P Airline -4.12 -3.95
Credit Rating (-1.08) (-1.31)
F-test (p-value) 0.377
Adjusted R
2 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.36
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
28Appendix: Ordered Probit Construction
Following Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) we use a latent variable model assuming that a latent
variable y∗ is determined by:
y∗ = Xβ + ζ (8)
where X includes one of our three measures of the redeployability of the aircraft portfolio serving
as collateral for each tranche, a vector of tranche covariates, a vector of airline controls, and vector
of year ﬁxed-eﬀects, and ζ is a standard normal random variable. Let α1 <α 2 < ... < αJ−1 be the
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1i f y∗ ≤ α1




J if y∗ >α J−1
where J=21 for Moody’s rating and J=22 in the case of S&P rating. Given the standard normal







Φ(α1 − Xβ)i f j = 1
Φ(αj − Xβ) − Φ(αj−1 − Xβ)i f 1 <j<J
1 − Φ(αJ−1 − Xβ)i f j = J
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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Figure 1: The cyclicality of the airline industry: weighted average proﬁtability (right hand scale) and market to book
(left hand scale) over time.
32Table 1:
Selected EETC Transactions
Issue Yield Spread Moody’s S&P
EETC Tranche size (%) (bp) Maturity rating rating LTV Collateral
Fedex 1998-1 1-A 458.1 6.720 125 1/2022 Aa2 AAA 0.387 5 MD-11F 8 A300F4-605R
Fedex 1998-1 1-B 178.6 6.845 138 1/2019 A1 AA- 0.532 5 MD-11F 8 A300F4-605R
Fedex 1998-1 1-C 196.8 7.020 155 1/2016 Baa1 BBB+ 0.688 5 MD-11F 8 A300F4-605R
NWA 1999-3 G 150.2 7.935 170 6/2019 Aaa AAA 0.441 14 BAE Avro RJ85
NWA 1999-3 B 58.6 9.485 325 6/2015 Baa2 BBB 0.614 14 BAE Avro RJ85
NWA 1999-3 C 30.5 9.152 300 6/2010 Baa3 BBB- 0.691 14 BAE Avro RJ85
Delta 2002-1 G-1 586.9 6.718 153 1/2023 Aaa AAA 0.519 17 B737-832 1 B757-232
8 B767-332ER 6 B767-432ER
Delta 2002-1 G-2 370.3 6.417 123 7/2012 Aaa AAA 0.519 17 B737-832 1 B757-232
8 B767-332ER 6 B767-432ER
Delta 2002-1 C 168.7 7.779 325 1/2012 Baa2 A- 0.611 17 B737-832 1 B757-232
8 B767-332ER 6 B767-432ER
33Table 2:
Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates Issuance
This table displays the distribution of 246 Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates (ETCs), Pass-Through Certiﬁcates (PTCs), and
Enhanced Equipment Trust Certiﬁcates (EETCs) that were issued in the U.S. public markets between 1990 and 2005 and are
included in our sample.
Airline 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 1990-2005
Alaska Airlines $98.9 $98.9
(4) (4)
America West $93.8 $1,079.9 $1,173.7
(4) (9) (13)
American Airlines $668.9 $65.9 $3,792.4 $871.9 $5,399.1
(23) (1) (14) (2) (40)
Atlas Air $543.5 $543.5
(4) (4)
Continental Airlines $2,287.7 $5,338.0 $1,575.5 $9,201.2
(19) (29) (7) (55)
Delta Air Lines $1,105.5 $79.6 $2,748 $1,125.9 $5,059.0
(10) (2) (8) (3) (23)
Federal Express 541.9 $1,615.7 $1,183.6 $3,341.2
(6) (14) (7) (27)
JetBlue Airways $929.3 $929.3
(6) (6)
Southwest Airlines $168.0 $610.4 614.3 $1,392.7
(3) (9) (3) (15)
United Air Lines $724.3 $610.6 $3,622.5 $4,957.4
(12) (3) (12) (27)
US Airways $168.6 $263.0 $2,947.3 $3,378.9
(3) (3) (10) (16)
Northwest Airlines $1,872.8 $749.1 $2,621.9
(12) (4) (16)
Total $3,476.1 $5,626.7 $23,742.3 $5,251.7 $38,096.8
(61) (56) (108) (22) (246)
34Table 3:
Summary Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Panel A displays tranche character-
istics. Panel B provides airlines characteristics. Tranche size is the dollar value (in $m) of the tranche. Number of Aircraft
is the number of aircraft serving as collateral. Spread is credit spread (in basis points) over its corresponding treasury yield.
Loan-to-value is the ratio between the cumulative book value of the loan and the appraised value of the aircraft used as
collateral for the loan. S&P Tranche Rating and Moody’s Tranche Rating are the ratings of the tranche assigned by either
S&P or Moody’s. Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Seniority is the tranche seniority (1=most senior).
Call Provision is a dummy variable that equals to one if the tranche is callable. Private is a dummy variable that equals to
one for private placement tranches. Size is the book value of the airline assets. Market to book is calculated as the market
value of equity minus the book value of equity, all over the book value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income
over assets. Leverage is deﬁned as total debt divided by total assets. S&P Airline Credit Rating is the airline long-term credit
rating.
Panel A: Tranche Characteristics
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Tranche size ($m) 154.87 47.6 112.5 194.5 148.5 0.7 1,319.6
Number of Aircrafts 16.2 4.0 13.0 21.0 11.9 1.0 46.0
Spread 198.8 135.0 182.0 238.0 107.5 40.0 909.4
Loan-to-value 0.616 0.490 0.600 0.780 0.149 0.329 0.890
S&P Tranche Rating N/A A BBB+ AA+ N/A B+ AAA
Moody’s Tranche Rating N/A A3 Baa2 Aa3 N/A B1 Aaa
Maturity 15.4 10.3 16.3 20.6 6.1 1.7 25.0
Seniority 1.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.80 1.00 4.00
Call Provision 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Private 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Airlines Characteristics
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Size ($m) 10,024.4 5,793.1 8.768.8 10,877.4 6,800.9 1,211.6 32,841.0
Market-to-Book 1.19 1.02 1.15 1.22 0.27 0.86 2.51
Proﬁtability 11.7% 8.97% 12.68% 14.26% 7.21% -7.26% 46.17%
Leverage 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.44 0.11 0.13 0.67
S&P Airline Credit Rating N/A BB+ BB- BBB N/A B- A
35Table 4:
Aircraft Type
This table lists the 22 diﬀerent aircraft types represented in our sample. For every aircraft type we list the number of aircraft
and percentageof total aircraft in our sample. The table also reports the time-series (1990-2005)mean of the 3 redeployability
measures for every aircraft type. Redeployability (# of aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (# of
operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (# of operators with more than 5 aircraft) is the number of
operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type.
(time-series mean)
(time-series mean) (time-series mean) # operators with
Aircraft Type Number Percent # of aircraft # of operators > 5a i r c r a f t
Airbus A300 25 2.30 278.9 53.1 17.8
Airbus A310 12 1.10 161.7 44.9 10.6
Airbus A319 144 13.26 188.7 36.3 8.9
Airbus A320 89 8.20 621.1 83.2 34.1
Airbus A321 10 0.92 116.6 31.0 9.1
Airbus A330 9 0.83 117.5 30.7 9.1
BAE SYSTEMS RJ Avroliner 14 1.29 44.1 6.0 2.1
BAE SYSTEMS Jetstream 31/S3 2 0.18 180.9 64.0 8.5
Boeing (McDonnell-Douglas) MD-11 24 2.21 130.4 26.6 9.8
Boeing (McDonnell-Douglas) MD-80 49 4.51 997.7 67.3 28.3
Boeing 737 (CFMI) 58 5.34 1502.3 162.9 66.0
Boeing 737 (NG) 222 20.44 686.1 143.3 28.7
Boeing 747 21 1.93 760.8 91.4 36.3
Boeing 757 141 12.98 688.0 80.0 26.2
Boeing 767 80 7.37 617.6 83.5 30.1
Boeing 777 56 5.16 185.8 25.8 9.9
Bombardier Dash 8 2 0.18 389.4 69.0 18.9
Embraer EMB-120 9 0.83 31.2 5.0 1.3
Embraer ERJ-135 8 0.74 19.3 6.7 0.7
Embraer ERJ-145 98 9.02 205.7 20.1 7.2
Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 11 1.01 73.8 28.5 4.4
Saab 340 2 0.18 274.0 40.1 12.5
Total 1086 100.00 – – –
36Table 5:
Redeployability Measures
This table provides descriptive statistics for the redeployability measures used in the empirical analysis. Panel A displays
that characteristics of the Redeployability measures. Redeployability (# of aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type;
Redeployability (# of operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (# of operators with more than 5
aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Panel B presents examples of speciﬁc tranches,
the collateral used to secure the tranches, and the redeployability measures values for each of the tranches.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
25th 75th Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max
Redeployability 958.6 365.0 661.7 1,624.1 793.8 72.0 3,485.0
(# of aircraft)
Redeployability 118.7 53.2 73.6 185.8 90.7 7.0 421.0
(# of operators)
Redeployability 40.2 17.6 27.0 63.0 30.0 2.0 131.0
(# of operators
with > 5a i r c r a f t )
Panel B: Examples of Tranche Redeployability
Issue Spread # of # of # of operators
EETC Tranche size (bp) aircraft operators with > 5 aircraft Collateral
Delta 2000-1 A1 341.1 148 1657.2 185.8 63.0 20 B737-832
18 B757-232
6 B767-332ER
Delta 2000-1 A2 738.1 170 1657.2 185.8 63.0 20 B737-832
18 B757-232
6 B767-332ER
Delta 2000-1 B 182.5 205 1657.2 185.8 63.0 20 B737-832
18 B757-232
6 B767-332ER
Delta 2000-1 C 238.3 188 1657.2 185.8 63.0 20 B737-832
18 B757-232
6 B767-332ER
NWA 1999-3 G 150.2 170 72.0 7.0 3.0 14 BAE RJ85
NWA 1999-3 B 58.0 325 72.0 7.0 3.0 14 BAE RJ85
NWA 1999-3 C 31.9 300 72.0 7.0 3.0 14 BAE RJ85
Southwest 1996 A1 113.1 72 2646.0 302.0 112.0 6 B737-300
Southwest 1996 A2 33.1 85 2646.0 302.0 112.0 6 B737-300
37Table 6:
Collateral Value and Credit Spread
The dependent variable in the regressions is credit spread (in basis points) over its corresponding treasury yield.
Seniority is the tranche seniority (1=most senior). Tranche size is the logarithm of the dollar value (in $m) of the
tranche. Private is a dummy variable that equals one for private placement tranches. Call Provision is a dummy
variable that equals one if the tranche is callable. Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Airline
size is the logarithm of the book value of the airline assets. Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity
minus the book value of equity, all over the book value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over
assets. S&P Airline Credit Rating is the airline long-term credit rating. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of
aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is
the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. All regressions include an intercept (not reported)
and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in
parenthesis.
Dependent Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Variable= Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Seniority 54.17 54.34 54.11 54.49 54.26 54.19
(5.67) (5.71) (5.68) (5.44) (5.36) (5.36)
Private 37.13 34.61 34.74 32.36 25.39 27.80
(3.65) (3.47) (3.37) (2.87) (2.07) (2.42)
Tranche size 1.84 2.41 2.25 4.03 4.49 4.12
(0.22) (0.29) (0.27) (0.52) (0.55) (0.52)
Call provision 72.61 71.73 71.75 68.77 70.01 69.61
(3.28) (3.17) (3.15) (3.62) (3.39) (3.32)
Maturity 0.35 0.32 0.27 0.49 0.49 0.51
(0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
Airline size -14.95 -15.67 -15.87 93.75 88.05 85.88
(-2.66) (-2.70) (-2.76) (2.11) (1.91) (1.97)
Market-to-Book 6.94 8.59 8.93 71.36 76.61 67.34
(0.24) (0.30) (0.32) (1.90) (2.07) (1.90)
Proﬁtability -259.55 -264.07 -259.51 -459.29 -487.05 -492.59
(-2.33) (-2.36) (-2.30) (-3.60) (-3.60) (-3.67)
S&P Airline 5.69 5.68 5.58 2.18 1.79 1.94






( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-2.39) (-3.18)
Year Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed-Eﬀects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.66
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
38Table 7:
Industry Conditions and Credit Spread
The dependent variable in the regressions is credit spread (in basis points) over its corresponding treasury yield. Seniority
is the tranche seniority (1=most senior). Tranche size is the logarithm of the dollar value (in $m) of the tranche. Private
is a dummy variable that equals one for private placement tranches. Call Provision is a dummy variable that equals one
if the tranche is callable. Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Airline size is the logarithm of the
book value of the airline assets. Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity minus the book value of
equity, all over the book value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over assets. S&P Airline Credit
Rating is the airline long-term credit rating. Industry Proﬁtability is a weighted average proﬁtability at the airline industry
level. Industry Market-to-Book is a weighted average industry market-to-book. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number
of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the
number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and airline
ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Variable= Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Seniority 42.92 42.99 42.85 40.50 40.39 40.77
(4.61) (4.44) (4.43) (4.23) (4.06) (4.14)
Private 18.38 2.85 9.76 23.86 6.88 13.31
(0.51) (0.07) (0.28) (0.62) (0.16) (0.36)
Tranche size -5.75 -5.29 -6.02 -6.18 -5.75 -6.38
(-1.09) (-1.02) (-1.17) (-1.04) (-1.01) (-1.14)
Call provision 22.53 23.42 24.10 28.51 29.94 29.47
(0.90) (0.92) (0.97) (1.43) (1.40) (1.40)
Maturity 1.14 1.16 1.12 1.00 1.03 0.99
(0.61) (0.63) (0.61) (0.55) (0.57) (0.54)
Airline size 125.31 121.84 117.56 145.66 141.34 134.56
(2.51) (2.55) (2.44) (2.66) (2.62) (2.57)
Market-to-Book 46.88 56.82 36.22 56.62 67.45 43.40
(1.82) (2.31) (1.35) (1.83) (2.29) (1.34)
Proﬁtability 115.46 81.59 60.75 -201.87 -252.18 -219.03
(0.84) (0.60) (0.50) (-1.43) (-2.01) (-1.87)
S&P Airline -4.73 -5.17 -3.70 0.18 -0.31 0.65
Credit Rating (-1.09) (-1.20) (-0.91) (0.04) (-0.06) (0.14)
Industry Proﬁtability -812.92 -827.86 -715.35
(-5.09) (-5.35) (-4.67)







( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-5.97) (-5.52)
Airline Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.46
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
39Table 8:
Collateral Value, Industry Conditions and Credit Spread
The dependentvariable in the regressionsis credit spread (in basis points) over its correspondingtreasury yield. Industry Proﬁtability
is a weighted average proﬁtability at the airline industry level. Industry Market-to-Book is a weighted average industry market-to-
book. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type,
Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. Regressions also include tranche
characteristics (seniority, size, a dummy for private placement, and controls for call provisions at tranche maturity), and airline
characteristics (airline size, market to book, proﬁtability, and S&P airline long-term credit rating) which are not reported for brevity.
All regressions include an intercept (not reported) and airline ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors that are
clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Variable= Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Industry Proﬁtability -1155.85 -1244.49 -1003.97
(-4.58) (-4.96) (-3.88)
Industry Market-to-Book -362.96 -420.69 -265.44
(-3.32) (-3.62) (-1.94)
Redeployability (aircraft) -0.142 -0.260
(-5.34) (-3.02)
Redeployability (operators) -1.208 -2.65
(-5.45) (-3.31)












Redeployability ( ≥ 5a i r c r a f t ) × 1.416
Industry Market-to-Bookt−1 (0.54)
Tranche Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.46
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 225
40Table 9:
Collateral Value and Credit Rating
The dependent variable in the regressions is either Moody’s tranche rating or S&P tranche rating. Seniority is the
tranche seniority (1=most senior). Tranche size is the logarithm of the dollar value (in $m) of the tranche. Private
is a dummy variable that equals one for private placement tranches. Call Provision is a dummy variable that equals
one if the tranche is callable. Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Airline size is the logarithm
of the book value of the airline assets. Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity minus the book
value of equity, all over the book value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over assets. S&P
Airline Credit Rating is the airline long-term credit rating. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per
type; Redeployability (operators) is the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of
operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. The table reports coeﬃcients (not marginal eﬀects) from ordered
probit regressions that include an intercept (not reported) and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using
standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Ordered probit regressions
Dependent Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s S&P S&P S&P
Variable= credit rating credit rating credit rating credit rating credit rating credit rating
Seniority 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.77 1.78 1.78
(7.47) (7.57) (7.62) (5.71) (5.78) (5.82)
Private 0.18 0.14 0.14 -0.53 -0.59 -0.59
(0.65) (0.53) (0.52) (-1.54) (-1.71) (-1.68)
Tranche size -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.31 -0.30 -0.30
(-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-2.75) (-2.66) (-2.70)
Call provision 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.82 0.80 0.80
(2.33) (2.27) (2.23) (3.00) (2.92) (2.87)
Maturity -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.39) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.14)
Airline size -0.49 -0.50 -0.51 -0.37 -0.38 -0.39
(-2.67) (-2.74) (-2.77) (-2.78) (-2.79) (-2.91)
Market-to-Book -1.02 -0.97 -0.94 -1.36 -1.33 -1.29
(-1.83) (-1.68) (-1.65) (-2.05) (-1.98) (-1.90)
Proﬁtability -0.14 -0.20 -0.10 -3.44 -3.50 -3.44






( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-2.02) (-2.49)
Fixed-Eﬀects Year Year Year Year Year Year
Pseudo R
2 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.32
Observations 227 227 227 223 223 223
41Table 10:
Collateral Value, Loan-to-value and Tranche Maturity
The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the cumulative loan-to-value (LTV) at the tranche level. The dependent variable in
columns 4-6 is the cumulative Loan-to-value (LTV) at the issue level. The dependent variable in columns 7-9 is the tranche
maturity in years. Seniority is the tranche seniority (1=most senior). Tranche size is the logarithm of the dollar value (in $m)
of the tranche. Private is a dummy variable that equals one for private placement tranches. Call Provision is a dummy variable
that equals one if the tranche is callable. Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Airline size is the logarithm of
the book value of the airline assets. Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity minus the book value of equity,
all over the book value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over assets. S&P Airline Credit Rating is the airline
long-term credit rating. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is the number
of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5 aircraft per type. All
regressions include an intercept (not reported) and airline and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics are calculated using standard-errors
that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent LTV LTV LTV LTV LTV LTV Maturity Maturity Maturity
Variable=
Seniority 0.10 0.10 0.10 - - - -1.63 -1.62 -1.63
(12.75) (13.26) (12.63) - - - (-2.91) (-2.83) (-2.90)
Private -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 - - - 0.51 0.32 0.41
(-1.23) (-1.11) (-1.18) - - - (0.29) (0.19) (0.24)
Tranche size 0.003 0.002 0.002 - - - 2.15 2.17 2.16
(0.53) (0.81) (0.40) - - - (2.41) (2.44) (2.42)
Call provision 0.02 0.02 0.02 - - - -0.82 -0.82 -0.81
(0.78) (0.81) (0.73) - - - (-0.68) (-0.66) (-0.67)
Maturity -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 - - - - - -
(-0.29) (-0.20) (-0.19) - - - - - -
Airline size -0.21 -0.22 -0.19 -0.004 -0.01 0.02 -4.36 -4.30 -4.50
(-1.44) (-1.51) (-1.30) (-0.04) (-0.10) (0.20) (-0.82) (-0.80) (-0.82)
Market-to-Book -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 3.11 3.29 3.04
(-0.78) (-1.06) (-0.63) (-2.34) (-2.23) (-2.15) (0.76) (0.81) (0.73)
Proﬁtability -0.23 -0.29 -0.19 -0.15 -0.13 -0.10 -19.01 -18.98 -19.53
(-0.69) (-0.81) (-0.55) (-0.86) (-0.84) (-0.55) (-1.20) (-1.13) (-1.17)
S&P Airline 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16
Credit Rating (0.56) (0.47) (0.55) (-1.94) (-2.14) (-1.88) (-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.36)
Redeployability 0.08 0.09 -1.04
(aircraft)*1000 (1.90) (2.72) (-1.32)
Redeployability 0.001 0.001 -0.01
(operators) (1.92) (2.65) (-1.39)
Redeployability 0.002 0.002 -0.03
( ≥ 5 aircraft) (1.63) (2.34) (-1.44)
Year Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.56 0.56 0.56
Observations 207 207 207 76 76 76 230 230 230
Unit of observation tranche tranche tranche issue issue issue tranche tranche tranche
42Table 11:
Economic signiﬁcance of Collateral Redeployability
Predicted changes in the dependent variables as each redeployability measure varies i) by one standard deviation, ii) from the 25th
percentile to the 75th percentile, iii) from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile. Panel A reports level changes (basis points (bp)
and percent changes relative to the sample spread mean (in parenthesis). Panel B reports marginal eﬀects of changes in credit rating
category probability associated with one standard deviation move, and their corresponding percent change relative to the sample
mean (in parentheses) in the redeployability measures. Panel C reports changes in LTV as well as percent changes relative to the
sample LTV mean (in parenthesis). The results are computed using the speciﬁcations in Tables 6, 8 and 9.
Panel A: Credit Spread
Standard 25th-75th 10th-90th
Deviation Percentile Percentile
Redeployability (aircraft) -40.5 bp -64.2 bp -99.5 bp
(-20.4%) (-32.3%) (-50.0%)
Redeployability (operators) -35.7 bp -52.2 bp -85.8 bp
(-18.0%) (-26.3%) (-43.2%)
Redeployability ( ≥ 5 aircraft) -38.3 bp -58.0 bp -93.9 bp
(-19.3%) (-29.2%) (-47.2%)
P a n e lB :C r e d i tR a t i n g
∂Prob[rating = AA+]/∂x ∂Prob[rating = A]/∂x ∂Prob[rating = BBB+]/∂x
x=Redeployability (aircraft) 0.02 -0.01 -0.05
(25.6%) (-6.9%) (-35.7%)
x=Redeployability (operators) 0.02 -0.01 -0.05
(25.6%) (-6.9%) (-35.7%)





Redeployability (aircraft) 0.071 0.113 0.176
(11.6%) (18.4%) (28.5%)
Redeployability (operators) 0.091 0.133 0.218
(14.7%) (21.5%) (35.3%)
Redeployability ( ≥ 5 aircraft) 0.060 0.091 0.147
(9.7%) (14.7%) (23.9%)
43Table 12:
Robustness Test - Controlling for Loan-to-value
The dependent variable in the regressions is credit spread (in basis points) over its corresponding treasury yield.
Loan-to-value is the cumulative loan-to-value (LTV) at the tranche level. Seniority is the tranche seniority (1=most
senior). Private is a dummy variable that equals one for private placement tranches. Tranche size is the logarithm of
the dollar value (in $m) of the tranche. Call Provision is a dummy variable that equals one if the tranche is callable.
Maturity is the number of years until the ﬁnal payment. Airline size is the logarithm of the book value of the airline
assets. Market to book is calculated as the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, all over the book
value of assets. Proﬁtability is deﬁned as operating income over assets. S&P Airline Credit Rating is the airline
long-term credit rating. Redeployability (aircraft) is the number of aircraft per type; Redeployability (operators) is
the number of operators per type, Redeployability (≥ 5 aircraft) is the number of operators who operate at least 5
aircraft per type. All regressionsinclude an intercept(not reported) and both year and airline ﬁxed-eﬀects. t-statistics
are calculated using standard-errors that are clustered by airline and reported in parenthesis.
Dependent Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit
Variable= Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread Spread
Loan-to-value 108.21 110.14 108.98 349.12 364.96 343.61
(0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (2.00) (2.03) (2.00)
Seniority 45.02 44.93 44.87 18.04 16.36 18.36
(7.28) (7.32) (7.38) (1.62) (1.39) (1.63)
Private 38.23 36.12 36.25 36.25 24.18 29.75
(3.23) (3.16) (3.15) (2.99) (1.72) (2.54)
Tranche size 0.40 0.99 0.86 2.34 3.92 2.80
(0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.29) (0.45) (0.34)
Call provision 66.00 64.96 65.20 55.81 55.69 58.78
(3.25) (3.13) (3.07) (4.34) (4.15) (3.53)
Maturity 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.16
(0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.08)
Airline size -15.67 -16.48 -16.56 179.35 174.68 152.11
(-1.60) (-1.64) (-1.68) (2.72) (2.31) (2.29)
Market-to-Book 17.53 19.60 19.23 94.32 107.13 84.20
(0.72) (0.78) (0.81) (2.90) (2.91) (2.99)
Proﬁtability -210.25 -213.64 -210.24 -342.78 -332.10 -418.18
(-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.84)
S&P Airline 7.32 7.31 7.19 2.23 2.14 1.37






( ≥ 5 aircraft) (-3.75) (-4.03)
Year Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed-Eﬀects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.68
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203
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